Euro‐vision of energy trade with Russia: Current problems and future prospects for EU solidarity in energy trade by Turksen, Umut
 1 
Euro-vision of Energy Trade with Russia: 
Current problems and future prospects for EU solidarity in energy trade 
 
 





This article provides an analysis of the legal framework against which 
the energy trade between the European Union (EU) and the Russian 
Federation (Russia) has been conducted. In doing so the EU’s ability 
and duty to operate its external energy trade in solidarity are analysed. 
In addition, the article assesses whether and to what extent the current 
EU – Russia energy trade is conducted within the confines of a rule 
based system. In order to illustrate the arguments, the relevant 
jurisprudence and EU Member State practices are utilised. It is 
concluded that principle of solidarity is a legal requirement which is 
embedded in the acquis communautaire of the EU therefore it shall be 
observed. However, the energy polices across the EU indicate that 
Member States do not act in solidarity when it comes to their energy 
relations with Russia. Furthermore, the overall framework for EU – 
Russia energy trade does not amount to one that is based on the rule 
of law as it lacks a number of essential elements inter alia an 
independent adjudication, effective and predictable legal redress and 
enforcement mechanisms. These characteristics expose the EU and 
its citizens to risk and uncertainty.  
 
“Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation: 
they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny 
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against their rigour ... If at my convenience I might break them, what 
would be their worth?”  
 






When the first European Community was founded over 60 years ago,2 
energy demand and prices were a fraction of what they are today. While 
energy has always been an important and a volatile field, liberalisation of 
energy trade at the international level was not a priority for states3  and 
ideological divisions between communist and market economy based 
countries further polarised energy relations. Following the end of the Cold 
War the concept of security has evolved to include non-traditional security 
areas such as energy.4 For example, the European Union (EU) was alarmed 
by the interruption of its energy supplies5 from Russia when on the 1st of 
January, 2006 Russia cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine for four days. 6 
Russia is the EU’s biggest energy supplier and this was the first time in the 
EU’s history when energy supplies from Russia were affected not by purely 
                                                             
2
 The First European Community (The European Coal and Steel Community) was 
founded in 1951.  
3
 Cottier T. et al., Energy in WTO law and policy, May 2010: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_7may10_e.pdf.  
4
 De Jong S., et al, ‘The 2009 Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute: Lessons for European 
Energy Crisis Management after Lisbon’ [2010] European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.15, 
511 and Youngs R., Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
5
 Crude oil and natural gas supplies are the sole concern of this paper. 
6
 Stern J., “The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006”, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies  (from January 16
th
 2006), available at, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0106.pdf (accessed on 12 Dec 2013); Stern 
J., “Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe: The Russian – Ukrainian Crisis of 2006” 
[2006] Asia – Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No.1.   
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technical or accidental but deliberate political and economic factors.7 A year 
later Belarusian oil supplies were cut-off by Russia, which received a strong 
condemnation from the EU leaders.8 Indeed, in 2007, the European Council 
of Foreign Relations asserted that Russia was the EU’s most divisive foreign 
policy issue and that the EU has been underperforming in this realm.9 The 
most severe and long-lasting example of Russian cut-offs occurred in 2009 
during the second Russian – Ukrainian Gas Crisis which included some of 
the EU Member States.10 Following the recent events in Ukraine and Crimea, 
on 01 April 2014, Gazprom announced a 40% price increase for gas for 
Ukraine.11 These events made it clear that Russia is prepared to use its 
energy resources as a political weapon. 12  The latest developments in 
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European Research, [2009] Vol. 5 (2), 274. 
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Ukraine and in Crimea in particular are likely to affect the energy trade 
further in the coming months. Given this recent digression of EU-Russia 
energy relations it is necessary to consider the adequacy of the current EU 
legal mechanisms of energy security management.  
           This article critically evaluates whether the existing legal framework of 
the EU-Russia energy relations operate in light of the EU’s ‘solidarity’ 
principle and explores if and to what extent it ensures a reliable energy 
supply from Russia to the EU. The legal analysis focuses only on the 
external aspect of this framework and does not cover any of the internal 
measures found in Member States. Accordingly, the institutional and legal 
tools conferred to the EU by the Member States in the Treaties are examined 
so as to establish the EU’s competence in monitoring and enforcing this 
principle. Moreover, the contribution of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in clarifying the division of competences between the EU and 
the Member States as well as the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in energy dealings with Russia is considered. Discussion is 
geared towards finding whether the EU has sufficient legal tools to speak 
with one voice in line with the ‘solidarity principle’13 when it comes to external 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(from 24
th
 January 2007) available at http://harvard-
bssp.org/files/2006/publications/eurofocus_v13n01.pdf (accessed on 12 Dec 2013).  
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 For example, Article 3(3) Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) requires the EU 
to establish an internal market, which shall promote solidarity among Member States. 
Article 4(3) Treaty on the EU (TEU) (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) provides that the 
Member States are required to sincerely cooperate with the EU and with each other. 
Articles 2 and 21 of the TEU stipulate ‘solidarity’ in international relations. Article 24 TEU 
states “mutual political solidarity among MS and Article 31 TEU underlines the “spirit of 
mutual solidarity” in EU’s external action. Chapter IV (Articles 27-38) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union is entitled ‘Solidarity.’ In Poucet v. 
Assurances générales de France (AGF) et Caisse mutuelle régionale du Languedoc-
Roussillon (Camulrac), Pistre v. Caisse autonome nationale de compensation de 
l’assurance vieillesse des artisans (Cancava), Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, [1993] 
ECR 637, the Court of Justice for the EU has also recognised ‘solidarity’ as a 
fundamental principle. Ross has even suggested solidarity to be conceived as a potential 
“new constitutional paradigm for the EU”. See, Ross M., ‘A New Constitutional Paradigm 
for the EU’ in Ross and Borgmann-Prebil (eds.) Promoting Solidarity in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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energy relations with Russia. There is no single definition of solidarity in the 
EU but it is seen as both a principle that distinguishes the EU and its 
Members from other international organisations14 and a fundamental value 
on which the EU (especially the Single Market) is based. Given the actual 
and potential vulnerabilities the EU face both economically and politically,15 it 
is argued that the principle of solidarity (embedded in the acquis) shall be a 
guiding principle in energy relations of the EU16 as it does in many other 
economic spheres. Indeed, the EU Commission states that efficient and fully 
integrated energy networks are the backbone of the single market.17 While 
the EU institutions, the EU Commission in particular, has been keen to 
assert the centrality of market liberalisation to its future energy policy and 
energy diplomacy and create a unified policy towards energy relations,18 this 
stance has been countered by the Member States’ bilateral energy 
agreements with Russia. These practices are discussed with reference to a 
number of case studies so as to illustrate different approaches to energy 
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 Hartwig I. and Nicolaides P., ‘Elusive Solidarity in an Enlarged European Union’ [2003] 
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 For a detailed analysis of energy vulnerability in the context of EU –Russia energy 
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 A Common Energy Policy has been of limited effect because the security framing 
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recognition of the fact that energy supply could not be dealt with only within the market 
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Security and Solidarity Action Plan: Second Strategic Energy Review [MEMO (08) 703]. 
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trade with Russia. Lastly, in part 5, a commentary on the future prospects of 
EU – Russia energy trade is provided.  
 
 
1. Russia as an important supplier of the energy for the EU 
 
The Russian Federation (Russia) is the primary energy supplier for 
the EU.19 Russia is known to have the largest natural gas reserves and 
seventh largest crude oil reserves in the world. It is also the biggest exporter 
of oil and gas to the EU, with its supplies accounting for 25% of oil and 33% 
of gas.20 The EU’s overall dependency on gas imports is expected to rise 
significantly by 2030 21  with its energy consumption rising by 15% in 
comparison to the demand in 2000. This is particularly true with respect to 
EU’s imports of the natural gas. The future projections show that European 
gas production is expected to decline22 and the reliance on the imported 
natural gas will grow considerably23 a fact recognised already in the EU 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC.24 A growing reliance on natural gas is mainly 
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 Supra note, Haghighi. Also see, Plebalgs A., “EU-Russia Energy Relations: Common 
Goals and Concerns” [2009] Oil Gas & Energy Law Vol.2; and The European 
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 www.energy.eu/#dependence (accessed on 12 Dec 2013); Eurogas statistics at 
www.eurogas.org. Russia provides 100% of gas imports of at least 7 Member States of 
the EU. The EU Commission, EU Energy Policy Data, SEC (2007) 12. 
21
 European Commission, “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply” (Green Paper) COM (2000) 769 Final. 
22
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Dec 2013). 
24
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security of natural gas supply, OJ L 127, 29/04/2004, Preamble, para.13. 
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due to its increasing popularity as a substitute to less eco-friendly fuels and 
its relatively low price in comparison with other energy resources.25  
On average, the EU’s dependence on Russian energy is 26% 26 
however; the level of dependency strongly varies between the Member 
States (MS).27 Out of 28 EU Member States only Denmark and the United 
Kingdom are independent on oil imports, and the same countries with the 
addition of the Netherlands have no dependency on gas imports.28 Andris 
Piebalgs, former Energy Commissioner for the European Commission stated 
that “the relationship [with Russia] is one of interdependence not 
dependence which means that Russia needs us much as we need Russia … 
sales of Russian raw materials to the EU contribute to over 40% of its federal 
budget and the EU represents almost 80% of cumulative foreign investments 
in Russia. This clearly shows interdependence… ”29.  
It is clear that Russia is and will continue to be, an important supplier 
of energy to the EU in the foreseeable future and it is engaged in promoting 
its Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines which are designed to feed 
Europe. This interdependence is recognised by in the Roadmap of the EU – 
Russia Energy Cooperation to 2050.30  However, this relationship is also 
described as one of “asymmetric interdependence” whereby Russia has 
been able to exploit divisions within the EU and pursue bilateral energy trade 
agreements with a number of Member States and uses its energy as 
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 E.g.: coal and oil. See, Nies. S., “Oil and gas delivery to Europe: An Overview of 
Existing and Planned Infrastructure” [2008] Oil Gas & Energy Law Vol.3.  
26
 Woeehrel S., “Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighbouring Countries” Congressional 
Research Service (report from 2
nd
 September 2009) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34261.pdf (accessed on 17 Dec 2013).  
27
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(accessed on 17 Dec 2013).  
28
 Supra note, Haghighi. 
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 European Commission, 2011, “Energy Roadmap 2050,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/doc/com_2011_8852_en.pdf.  
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leverage in diplomatic, trade, economic and political disputes.31 Furthermore, 
if we were to confirm Christie’s argument that “it is rational for Europeans to 
understand Russia as an ambitious geopolitical player whose ruling elites 
are motivated by a combination of nationalism, domestic political survival 
and national economic gain” 32  then it becomes even more necessary to 
place this relationship on a legal, predictable mandate rather than leave it to 
the less certain field of power politics. In the current global economic crisis, a 
secure energy relations and supply are imperative for the functioning and 
growth of the EU and its common market effectively.  Accordingly, the 
solidarity among the EU Member States is essential and hence it is 
expressed in the provisions of EU law. 
 
1.2. What is the Security of Energy Supply?  
The concept of “security of energy supply”33 is used interchangeably 
with a term having the same meaning as “energy security”.34 Energy security 
is vital for everyday activities of a functioning society35 thus the need for 
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 Supra note, Judah B., et al. p. 49.  
32
 Supra note 4, Christie, p. 276. 
33
 The definition of ‘security of energy supply’ has been a subject to an extensive 
discussion, see: Saga B., “Introduction of Competition in Gas Markets: Effects on 
Contract Structures and Security of Supply”, in Hancher L., “The European Energy 
Market: Reconciling Competition and Security of Supply”, Bundesanzeiger, 1995, pg. 93; 
See Barton B., Redgwell C., Ronne A., Zillman D., “Introduction”, in Barton B., Redgwell 
C., Ronne A., Zillman D, “Energy Security – Managing Risk in as Dynamic Legal and 
Regulatory Environment”, Oxford University Press, 2004, p.5; Cameron P. “Competition 
in Energy Markets – Law and Regulation in the European Union”, (Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Alhajji A.F., ‘What is Energy Security? (5/5)’ [2008] LI Middle East 
Economic Survey, 2. 
34
 Maican O-H, “Some Legal Aspects of Energy Security in the Relations Between EU 
and Russia” Romanian Journal of European Affairs Vol.9, No.4.   
35
 Most of the industries, such as agriculture, mining, construction and manufacturing rely 
heavily on the energy supplies. The level of the demand for the energy varies from 
country to country and from industry to industry depending on a number of factors , see: 
Supra note, International Energy Outlook 2004  
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reliable sources of adequate supplies of energy is “… central to states’ 
security, economic development and stability”.36  
Security of energy supply is currently at the top of the agendas of 
most European states 37  and the EU, 38  which makes it an international 
security issue. Security of supply is also “a cornerstone of European energy 
policy”39 being one of its three main objectives.40 From Russia’s perspective, 
energy security is defined as the “… state of protection of the country, its 
citizens, society, state, economy from the threats to the secure fuel and 
energy supply” and “the full and secure provision of energy resources to the 
population and the economy on affordable prices that at the same time 
stimulate energy saving, the minimization of risks and the elimination of 
threats to the energy supplies of the country”.41 Russia has repeatedly used 
energy both as a foreign policy tool in the form of a threat or punishment for 
states that have conducted policies that Russia dislikes.42 Thus, as in any 
other defence and international relations policy conducted at the EU level, 
energy relations policy of the EU also requires unified and cooperative 
approach among its Members. This would allow the EU to have a strong 
standing and gravity of bargaining power when dealing with its trade partners 
                                                             
36
 Flynn C., “Russian roulette: the ECT, transit and Western European energy security” 
[2006] Oil Gas & Energy Law Vol.4.   
37
 Ibid.  
38
 The EU’s official view on Energy Security: “Energy supply security must be geared to 
ensuring, the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability at 
a price which is affordable while respecting environmental concerns. Security of supply 
does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims 
to reduce the risks linked to such dependence.”: Supra note, EC Green Paper (2000). 
39
 Supra  note, Selivestrov . 
40
 Amongst “sustainability” and “competitiveness” – Supra note, EC Green Paper (2006) 
41
 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, “The Summary of the Energy Strategy of 
Russia for the Period of up to 2020” (2003) approved by the Decree No. 1234-p of 
August 28, 2003, issued by the Government of Russian Federation;  
42
 Nygren B., The rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards the Baltic 
CIS Countries, (Routledge, 2008) and Lucas E., The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and 
the Threat to the West, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). For example, Russia cut off 
gas to Czech Republic when it supported the US missile defence plan in 2008. See, 
Elder M., Russia exerts its power, Financial Times, 31 October 2008, p. 6. 
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in the energy field. The EU’s small number of energy suppliers; Russia, Iran, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia and in the Caspian ex-Soviet countries such as 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Chechnya have not developed 
liberal open markets nor do they have democratic governance based on the 
rule of law; and in almost all of these jurisdictions, power politics determine 
energy policy. Furthermore, energy is the only efficient and credible Russian 
export sector and arguably the most important commodity for its economic 
stability. Energy as the bloodline of Russian economy is somehow a 
weakness for Russia and therefore makes Russia a fierce trade partner.  
This is yet another incentive for the EU to establish solidarity in its external 
energy relations with Russia.  
 
 
2. Legal framework for the EU external energy policy 
 
The concept of the EU’s competence in the area of energy policy 
could be viewed in a broader context of the EU’s external energy policy and 
international affairs.43 It has been suggested that the EU’s external energy 
policy has three distinct dimensions.44 In one of the dimensions the EU is 
acting45 as two distinct entities:  
I. as a single economic block with its internal (regional) law making 
powers and external law making powers within the 
international/supranational organisations;46 and 
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 The notion of policy could be defined as a “set of coherent norms and values, forming 
a political regime”.:  Belyi V.A., “The EU's External Energy Policy”, in Guayo I., 
Redgewell  C., Roggenkamp M.M., “Energy Law in Europe: National, EU an International 
Regulation (2
nd
 Ed., Oxford University Press, 2007); general definition of a regime 
provides that regime is a formation of  “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge” , see:  Krasner 
S., “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables” 
[1982] International Organisation 36 (2), pg. 1 -21. 
44
 Supra note, Belyi. 
45
 Bretherton C., Vogler J., “The European Union as a Global Actor”, (Routledge, 2006). 
46
 On this level EU’s acting under the European Union competence and is externally 
represented by the Commission.  
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II. as an intergovernmental organisation expressing the geopolitical 
security preferences of individual Member States.47 
 
The analysis in this paper adopts the former perspective as it aims to 
focus on the legal framework, instead of issues of diplomacy and 
international politics, which fall under the latter.  
 
2.1. European Union as a single economic block  
The EU treaties provide specific competences and powers to the EU 
institutions in clearly defined areas (e.g. free movement of goods, 
competition policy, etc) and it is in these areas that the Member States have 
given up their sovereignty to a great extent. This is also acknowledged and 
reiterated on a number of occasions by the Court of Justice for the EU 
(CJEU). For example, the CJEU spoke of the new legal order constituted by 
the EU for whose benefit the Member States had limited their sovereign 
rights48 and that the law stemming from the treaties cannot be overridden by 
rules of national law, and national courts have a duty to give full effect to 
provisions of EU law.49 It is also established that where there is a conflict 
between EU and national law, the national law rule must set aside that rule.50 
 The crucial issue in analysing competences of the EU regarding the 
external energy policy is the marking of the division of the competences 
between the EU and the Member States. As a general rule, the more the 
issue is related to the basic community principles and single market rules, 
the more likely it is that it will fall within the competences of the EU. 
Expansion of these basic “common” principles results in the gradual 
extension of the EU’s competences. Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) 2009 provides that the EU has the authority to 
negotiate and conclude international agreements in areas regarded as the 
                                                             
47
 On this level EU’s actions fall under Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) with its 
international representation by the High Representative for the CFSP. 
48
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL.  
49
 Case 106/77 Simmenthal and Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesllschaft.  
50
 Case C-213/89 Factortame (No2). 
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common commercial policy.51 Furthermore, where the Union promulgates 
common rules in order to implement such a common policy, the Member 
States of EU have no longer been authorized to individually or collectively 
conclude other obligations with third parties affecting those rules.52 The issue 
of the division of competences between the EU and the Member States 
analysed here is closely tied to the question of whether the EU can and shall 






2.1.1. From the European Coal and Steel Community to the 
Treaty of Nice  
The first European Treaty, establishing European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 195254 was primarily concerned with the distribution of 
domestic energy resources amongst its original six Member States (MS).55 In 
the 1940’s and 1950’s the primary energy resource was coal. Internal coal 
and gas resources were sufficient and the reliance on oil imports was 
minimal. In the following years oil began to slowly substitute coal as an 
energy resource due to its competitive price. Subsequently, the European 
Community’s (EC) focus began to shift from internal regulation of coal to 
external supplies of other energy resources. This shift has not been legally 
reflected in the treaties and the MS were free to determine their relations 
                                                             
51
 TFEU Article 207. 
52
 Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, 274.  
53
 Supra note, Haghighi, p. 67. 
54
 The Treaty itself expired in 2002, but some of its provisions were incorporated into 
subsequent treaties; for details see: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm 
(accessed on 17 Dec 2013).  
55
 Article 3 of the ECSC “…to promote a policy of natural resources rationally and 
avoiding their unconsidered exhaustion”. For a historical overview see, supra note, 
Haghighi. 
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with non-EC countries. 56  This lack of legal mandate on EC’s ‘external 
security of supply’ was only partially justifiable, because while the energy 
reserves were sufficient at that time, the future dependence on external 
energy resources was foreseeable. On the other hand, Article 95 of the 
ECSC established a legal avenue which provided that the necessary 
(additional) powers might be granted to the Community upon the unanimous 
approval from the Council of Ministers. 
  Subsequent treaties – The European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) Treaty, 1957 and European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty, 1957 which were later amalgamated (together with ECSC, 1952) by 
the Merger Treaty 1967,57 covered all the main energy activities, including 
the rational use of natural resources and the funding of common 
infrastructure projects.58 One of the important additions was Article 103 EEC 
that offered the Council a possibility (upon the proposal from the 
Commission) to adopt measures in a case of difficulties that may arise in 
supply of certain products, including energy supply. The EURATOM Treaty 
on the other hand, did not stipulate any measures that would contribute to 
the security of the energy supplies and indeed ‘favoured’ the use of nuclear 
energy over the use of imported fossil fuels.59  
All subsequent treaties60 with the exceptions of the EC Treaty61 and 
the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 did not provide any provisions helping to secure 
energy supply to the EU.62 Thus, there was very little legal imperative or duty 
for the EU and its Member States to act jointly when it came to energy policy 
and contracts with non-EU countries.  
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 Supra note, Belyi. 
57
 For details, see, http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed on 17 Dec 2013). 
58
 Supra note, Belyi. 
59
  Oil, gas or coal; see Articles 64 and 66 of the EURATOM.    
60
 Single European Act of 1986, The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Treaty of Nice 2001. 
61
 Analysed below.  
62
 Maastricht Treaty included a reference to measures in the sphere of energy in Art 3 
EC, in the context of sustainable development. However the article did not determine the 
ways through which the activities under this article should be put in place, rendering it 
unusable by the Community. Subsequent treaties (Nice and Amsterdam) also contained 
Article 3, but similarly without detailed rules on its implementation. 
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2.1.2. From the European Community63 Treaty to the Treaty of 
Lisbon – The EU 
The reason why both Treaties (the European Community Treaty and 
the subsequent Lisbon Treaty) should be analysed together is that their 
combination most accurately portray the current position of the EU law in the 
area of the external energy relations. With the Treaty of Lisbon 200764 (ToL) 
in force since the 1st of December 2009, the EC Treaty has been amended 
and number of other changes has been implemented,65 but the majority of 
these provisions have not yet been tested. The provisions under the EC 
Treaty were put to practice for a number of years and arguably provided a 
solid basis for the reforms under the ToL.   
Article 5 of the EC Treaty 1957, stated that “the community shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein”. Thus once the powers had been assigned 
to the Community, the MS were prevented to take unilateral action.66  
The powers conferred to the Community67 by the EC Treaty, fell into 
two categories: explicit and implicit.68 Explicit powers were listed in Articles 3 
and 4 of the EC Treaty in the form of “objectives”. None of these expressly 
stated whether the EU has competence69 in relation to the energy or energy 
security. However, the Community developed the internal powers that were 
                                                             
63
 “EC”, “EU” and the “Community” will be used interchangeably in this text withstanding 
the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.   
64
 For details, see: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (accessed on 10 Dec 
2013).  
65
 For the general analysis see: Fairhurst J., “Law of the European Union”, 9
th
 Ed., 
(Pearson Education Limited, 2012); Kaczorowska A., “European Union Law”, (Routledge-
Cavendish, 2010).  
66
 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 593 and 584.  
67
 Now the “Union”. 
68
 For further analysis see: Supra note, Kaczorowska.  
69
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not expressly derived from the treaty, but from global and/or general 
objectives. In the area of the energy security, the EC’s powers were 
extended through the use of the “flexibility clause” pursuant to Article 308. 
This provision enabled the Community to expand the legislation into the 
areas where no separate legal basis was provided. In other words, Article 
308 allowed the EC to adopt measures only if no other provision in the 
Treaty did.70 This article was extensively used in the area of energy, for a 
wide-range of purposes such as concluding various international trade 
agreements including the Energy Charter Treaty.71  
The EC Treaty also provided two other provisions allowing the EU to 
grant internal measures in the field of energy: Article 95 provided a solution 
to the difficulties that may arise in the harmonisation of the internal market, 
whereas Article 100 was drafted to be used when the “severe difficulties 
arise in the supply of a certain products”.72    
Similar to the EC Treaty, Article 13(2) TEU (as amended by the Treaty 
of Lisbon) has reinstated the obligation on the EU to act pursuant to the 
principle of conferral. Article 2(6) TEU stipulates that the scope of the EU’s 
competences should be determined by the treaties. It introduces three 
categories of Union’s Power: exclusive competence;73 shared competence;74 
and actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member 
States. 75  According to Article 4(2)(i) TFEU, “energy” falls in the area of 
shared competence between the EU and MS. It means that MS can only 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts if this right has not yet been 
exercised by the EU.76      
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72
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   2.1.3. Principle of Solidarity 
   The spirit or the principle of solidarity has been recognised as one of the 
founding and guiding principles of European Communities. Since the very 
start of the European Project solidarity has been articulated both in legal and 
political contexts. For instance, the Preamble to the Treaty Establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951) stipulated that ‘Europe 
can be built only through real practical achievements which will first of all 
create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for 
economic development’. Later in the Single European Act (1986) and in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) ‘solidarity’ appeared alongside ‘cohesion’. 77  The 
Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty not only commits its signatories ‘to deepen 
the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their 
culture and their traditions but also expands it in numerous policy areas and 
activities of the EU and its Member States. One of the important changes 
brought by the ToL in relation to energy is indeed the principle of solidarity.78 
This principle has been promoted by the Commission since the 1990s and 
appears in various parts and contexts of the ToL including the security of the 
energy supplies. For example, Article 194(1) TFEU provides that in the 
context of establishment of energy market and protection of environment, 
“Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member 
States, to:  
a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;  
b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union”. 
 
               However, Article 194(2) states that the measures taken under 
Article 194 shall not affect the MS’s right to choose the energy resources and 
suppliers.79  Thus, Maltby argues that ‘solidarity’ in this context is vague80 
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and Konstadinides opines that the solidarity clause (under Article 222 TFEU) 
renders the solidarity as an “interpretative, rather than legally binding 
commitment”.81 This is not completely accurate because Article 222 TFEU 
stipulates solidarity in situations arising from atrocities and in crisis 
management, including modern threats from non-state agents such as 
terrorist organisations and manmade disasters, areas which do not 
necessarily fall into the economic realm and policy. Whereas the other legal 
provisions outlined here are linked to the Single Market and intra-community 
trade activities thus are directly linked to explicit aims and objectives of the 
Treaties for which the EU has competence. It should also be noted that rules 
on Single Market have consistently been held to have direct effects and 
supremacy.82 It seems that the requirements of solidarity in the economic 
field and energy policy are clear and there has been ‘prior consultation’ 
between Member States and political institutions of the EU. Therefore, it 
could be argued that principle of solidarity has gravity and may be invoked 
as a duty on Member States in the context of common internal and external 
energy policy. The Treaty objectives are intrinsically far too valuable to be 
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held hostage to the norm of state sovereignty and discretion provided by 
Article 194(2) and, therefore, ought to override that norm. 
In addition, Article 122(1) TFEU provides that in a case of severe 
difficulties in the supply of “certain products notably in the area of energy”, 
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide upon the 
measures appropriate to the economic situation. That decision shall again be 
reached in a spirit of solidarity between MS.  
The Treaty of Lisbon also foresees a possibility of difficulties in cases 
of energy crisis when Member States have an obligation to consult each 
other and take necessary steps to resolve these problems, placing the issue 
of energy security in a broader context. These instances are laid out in 
Article 347 TFEU and are “clearly defined and do not lend themselves to any 
wide interpretation”83 which do cover “measures taken for reasons of public 
safety and security”.84 
“Energy”, unlike other areas covered by the Treaty, does not contain 
an express encouragement for the MS to foster co-operation with third 
countries and international organisations. It has been suggested that such 
“categorisation of the Union’s policy in the field of energy is designed to allow 
the Union to embark on activities at the external level because nothing in the 
provision limits the competence of the Union in this respect”.85  
Article 308 EC which was extensively used in the area of energy has 
been modified in the Treaty of Lisbon under Article 352 TFEU. Article 352(1) 
TFEU provides the Union with a general legislative power: “If action by the 
Union should prove necessary… to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council…shall adopt the appropriate measures”. On the one hand the scope 
of Article 352(1) TFEU is wider than of Article 308 EC as it refers to the 
objectives of the EU and is not confined to the internal market which was the 
case under Art 308 EC. On the other hand its application is limited, as it 
requires unanimity in the Council and the consent of the European 
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Parliament.86 Furthermore, over-reliance on this article would no longer be 
necessary as the EU has gained express legal basis in the area of energy,87 
which is likely to expand as the secondary legislation becomes denser.88  
While Article 95 EC which makes reference to energy in the context of 
environmental protection has been “transferred” to the Treaty of Lisbon 
under Article 114 TFEU, it adds no further competences to the EU regarding 
energy security.  
The EU institutions which are endowed with the responsibility to 
devise both an internal and external common energy policy and strategy 
have indeed given heed to the principle of solidarity in EU’s secondary 
legislation. For example, the EU Commission highlighted the importance of 
completing the internal market in natural gas and indicated that the existing 
rules and measures were not adequate89 and titled its 2nd Strategic Energy 
Review as “An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan”. 90  While 
Regulation (EC) No. 663/2009 requires MS to implement the aforementioned 
Action Plan in light of solidarity among MS,91 EU Directive 2009/73 provides 
that the MS “shall cooperate in order to promote regional and bilateral 
solidarity” (emphasis added).92 It is important to note that the use of the term 
‘shall’ indicates that there is an explicit obligation on the Member States to 
cooperate. The EU Directive 2009/119/EC 93  also calls upon the MS to 
cooperate with the Commission so that Community-wide solidarity and 
cohesion in regards to energy (oil) policy can be ensured and the objectives 
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of this Directive94 can be achieved.95 Similarly, the European Parliament (EP) 
has consistently made reference to the solidarity in its recent reports and 
legal proposals pertaining to energy.96 In addition, jurisprudence of the CJEU 
indicates that the principle of solidarity must inform Member States’ action 
and implementation of secondary legislation.97 As Ross opines, solidarity in 
the EU is a real and viable ‘constitutional principle’98 and it could be argued 
that it is becoming one of the general principles of EU law.  
 
2.1.4. Developments by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in the area of energy security 
The CJEU’s institutional role conferred under the Treaties represents 
a significant transfer of jurisdictional authority, previously embedded within 
national courts, and underpins the supremacy of EU law. For many years the 
CJEU has been involved in clarifying the division of powers between the EU 
and Member States. Most of the EU’s powers and competences in the area 
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of energy security and supply were implied prior to the ToL,99 consequently it 
was even more important to draw a clear demarcation line separating these 
competences. It can be asserted that the CJEU is “both willing and able to 
assert itself as the highest court in a constitutional order adjudicating on 
competences”100 and its “opinion may be sought on the questions concerning 
the division of competences between the Community and the Member 
States”.101 It is however up to the EU institutions to initiate such inquiry for 
the CJEU’s perusal. So far, the Commission, as the main EU institution 
endowed with the duty of monitoring the Member States and ensuring the 
aims and objectives of the Treaties are achieved,102 has not challenged any 
unilateral Member State activity in the energy sector.103  
 
2.1.4.1. Article 30 EC Treaty – Public policy grounds and 
“necessity” 
Initially, the CJEU’s opined that the Member States were the best 
authorities to make decisions on the security of their energy supplies thus 
has given deference to executive decisions within Member States. However, 
this view began to change giving a way to the expansion of the external 
competences in energy relations to the Community.104 
In the Campus Oil case,105 the CJEU held that even if the Community 
rules on the matter of energy supply exist, the complementary measures of 
MS on national level should not be excluded. Therefore the MS were 
permitted to derogate from the basic Treaty principles under Article 30 EC 
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(now Article 36 TFEU) on “public security” grounds, inter alia due to the 
“necessity” of securing the energy supplies. The CJEU’s rationale for this 
decision was the fact that the petrol was very important to each country’s 
existence and economic security.106  
     In the case of Commission v Hellenic Republic, 107  the issue of 
“necessity” of securing the energy supply was reconsidered. Although the 
facts of this case were similar to the Campus Oil,108 the CJEU interpreted the 
notion of “necessity” more strictly and held that it should be interpreted 
beyond “purely economic reasoning” and expressed the need for “less 
restrictive” measures than straightforward derogations. This decision 
changed the threshold for the MS’ ability to restrict trade in energy. 
Members States’ freedom to derogate from the Treaty provisions due 
to the “necessity” of securing energy supplies was further limited in the 
Opinion of the Advocate General in the Preussen Elektra case. 109  It 
remained doubtful 110  whether it was still possible to rely on the “public 
security” exceptions under Article 36 TFEU if these particular issues have 
been addressed by the EU in the form of a secondary legislation.  
 
2.1.4.2. Implied EU external powers & the doctrines of 
“necessity” and “effect” 
The EU can acquire legal personality (i.e. a capacity to be 
represented internationally and to enter into international treaties with third 
parties) only through transfer of that power from Member States to the EU. 
This could be done in two ways: through explicit reference to the provisions 
of the Treaty111 or through the progressive development of the CJEU’s case 
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law that originates from the case of ERTA.112 In ERTA it was held that if 
there is any common rule that deals with externalities,113 the EU has an 
implied external power in the field covered by this common rule.114 
Furthermore, the EU has the power to enter into international 
agreements in policy areas for which it has competence and may add to the 
agreement without the need for an additional legal basis.115 This principle 
was later developed by the CJEU and has been referred to as the “necessity 
doctrine”. The “necessity doctrine” grants the EU an authority to enter into 
international agreements if it is necessary for attaining objectives of the 
EU,116  but only when the “attainment of the objectives” of the Treaty is 
inextricably linked to the externality.117  
Another important doctrine developed by the CJEU extending the 
external competence of the Community, is the “effect doctrine” stating that if 
the international commitment falls within the area covered by the external 
measure, then the “effect” is established.118  
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The operation of the two principles - “necessity” and “effect” - has two 
major consequences for energy security. Firstly, the more energy related 
measures come to existence the more the EU competence in this area will 
be. Secondly, the gradual expansion of the internal and external competence 
of the EU might lead to its exclusive competence in some aspects of energy 
security policy.119  
While there is a linguistic certainty pertaining to the principle of solidarity 
therefore an implicit and explicit duty to observe this principle is placed on 
Member States, political questions and the intent of the Member States have 
continuously hindered the realisation of solidarity in the energy relations 
between the EU and Russia. In other words, the provisions pertaining to the 
principle of solidarity have been considered as precatory.120 “Precatory treaty 
provisions are deemed judicially unenforceable not because of the parties’ 
(or anyone’s) intent, but because what the parties agreed to do is considered 
in our system of separated powers, a ‘political’ task not for the courts to 
perform.”121 This trend can clearly be seen in the context of energy policy 
and deference afforded to Member States by the CJEU.  
However, it should be noted that the objectives of the EU are worded in 
mandatory terms. For example, Article 3 (3) TEU states that:  
 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and 
technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, 
and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and 
men; solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. 
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It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity 
among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity 
and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced.” 
 
          This provision, created by the Member States, is clearly intended to 
establish legal effects. In relation to questions of intent, the CJEU does not 
concern itself with the intentions of the Member States in assessing the legal 
effects of the Union provisions it is called on to interpret and apply. Instead 
the CJEU assesses the language of a provision in light of the overall 
purposes of the Treaties (teleological approach). In this regard, a ‘general’ 
interpretive assumption is that all individual Union measures are intended by 
the Member States collectively to fit within the overall scheme of the Union 
legal order, which is based on the achievement of the Treaty objectives. Yet, 
in the context of state practice and solidarity in the energy relations with 
Russia, such intentions are hard to come by. 
3. Member States’ Practises  
 
          Each EU Member State has had a different relation with Russia. The 
scope of this paper does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of all 28 
Member States yet, these differences can be explained in light of historical, 
geo-political,122 social, economic factors and national interests.  It can be 
argued that this wide spectrum of factors have shaped the energy relations 
with Russia where by Member States negotiate gas imports with Gazprom 
bilaterally. Consequently, some get much better deals than others and 
Gazprom insists that the gas pricing agreements should be kept confidential.  
           Bulgaria as an ex-communist country under the Soviet Union found 
herself vulnerable during the January 2009 gas crisis and still finds herself 
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pushed into a corner by Russia.123 Gazprom has linked gas prices to South 
Stream pipeline participation and inserted clauses to its contracts which 
require Bulgaria to finance this project,124 exclude competition and impose 
penalty payments if new contracts are not expedited.125  EU law stipulates 
that such agreements ought to work in line with the aims and objectives of 
the EU and its single market (including competition and the Third Energy 
Package)126 and requires that stake holders such as civil society groups, 
local residents, environmental organisations, be consulted on such large 
construction projects. At the time of the South Stream pipeline agreement 
between Russia and Bulgaria, the EU Commission had not been informed 
about the environmental impact assessment of this project nor was there any 
transparency in regards to the other provisions of the agreement. 
Subsequently, the Commission referred Bulgaria along with Romania to the 
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CJEU (under Art 258 TFEU) for failing to fulfil their obligations under EU 
law.127  
              Poland, as a country previously under the control of Soviet Union, 
has a history of strained relations with Russia. It is therefore not surprising 
that Poland’s 45% of its energy imports from Russia is perceived as a threat 
to Poland’s energy security.128 Russia’s dominance is enhanced by its large 
share in Polish oil and gas imports and a lack of Polish share in Russia’s 
exports. Poland’s position is complicated by the fact that the country hosts a 
number of energy routes from Russia to West Europe. Thus as a consumer 
and a transit country, Poland is important not only for Russia but also for the 
region. In some instances, Poland has been able to utilise its EU member 
status and its logistical transit position in taking contrasting stances against 
Russian initiatives. For instance, Poland delayed the new EU- Russia 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement by several months following its 
meat export dispute with Russia.129  In addition, Poland has lobbied hard for 
‘energy solidarity’ and Europeanisation of energy security since the 2006 
Russia-Ukraine energy crisis130 and sought to diversify its energy supplies.131 
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For instance, in 2006, Poland presented a joint position on the diversification 
of energy supplies to Central and East European countries, prepared 
together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Austrian EU Presidency, 
and also promoted a joint action plan (worked out with the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania) to reduce 
dependence on Russian natural gas. This was a clear indication that Poland 
wanted a joint action in energy relations with Russia.  
           The efforts by Poland have, to a certain extent, been hampered by the 
German engagement with Russia, which resulted in Germany being branded 
as a Russian “Trojan horse” within the EU.132 As an influential member of the 
EU, Germany relies heavily on Russian energy supplies and is Gazprom's 
largest customer and Russia's biggest trading partner in general. Germany's 
successful export-driven economic success depends partly on Russian 
energy supplies. For many years Germany and Russia enjoyed smooth 
energy trade relations and as a result Germany has been able to concede 
special deals from Russia to the point that previous German chancellor, 
Gerhard Schroeder, is one of the board directors for the North European Gas 
Pipeline (NEGP) who complemented President Putin as a “flawless 
democrat”. It is argued that promise of a steady flow of cheap Russian 
energy has encouraged German politicians to surrender a degree of 
sovereignty by reducing their enthusiasm for EU unity and collective action, 
on international policy in general133 and on the energy front in particular.134 
For instance, Merkel led the effort to block proposed EU regulations that 
would have restricted foreign companies from buying European energy 
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utilities. These measures were aimed at slowing Gazprom's monopoly in the 
energy market.  
           Russia sees its relationship with Germany as a valuable asset for 
asserting greater influence in European affairs 135  thus provides certain 
privileges in return. For instance, Gazprom has signed deals containing 
flexible and favourable terms that have proved very profitable for its German 
partners, such as its main Nord Stream collaborators: energy giant E.ON and 
chemical giant BASF. These companies each control almost one-quarter of 
the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas fields that will provide most of the supplies for 
Nord Stream. Germany, the Netherlands and France have 49% stake in the 
Nord Stream project, which is another indication that there is a cultivation of 
bilateral agreements rather than a unified approach among EU Member 
States when it comes to energy security and relations with Russia.  
           Gazprom negotiates bilaterally between itself and its corporate 
partners in the EU, which results in an asymmetric bargaining power in 
favour of Gazprom. Whilst Gazprom benefits from a centralised data 
analysis, individual European energy companies end up competing against 
each another with incomplete information about one another and about 
supply prospects. As analysed by Westphal in detail, Germany’s bilateral 
relationship with Russia has been beneficial to Germany, yet this markedly 
state-centric approach to energy has somewhat undermined international 
governance, namely the common EU approach.136 However, more recently, 
with Germany’s initiative the EU Joint Political and Security Committee with 
Russia was established and Polish-German joint letter called for a 
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coordinated EU approach to Russia “based on shared interests and 
objectives”. 137  These developments could be seen as the start of a 
convergence amongst two Member States who traditionally differed in their 
relations with Russia.  
 
           Italy is the Russian Federation’s third largest trade partner and 
purchase approximately 15% of its oil and 30% of its gas from Russia.138 
Like Germany, Italy has benefited from certain preferential treatment by 
Russia: South Stream AG, is a joint company comprised of Gazprom and 
ENI, Italy’s main oil company. South Stream project rivals Nabucco project 
which is supposed to diversify EU’s energy supplies thus reducing reliance 
on Russian energy. It is argued that Italy was keen to endorse the South 
Stream project with the prospect of profits by politically connected 
companies.139 However, there is also another factor behind Italy’s stance; it 
is expected that gas production in Italy (along with Germany and the United 
Kingdom) will decline substantially over the next two decades.140  
One of the other leading energy consumers in the EU, France has also 
forged strong links with Russia. The leading French electricity group, 
Électricité de France (EDF), has acquired a minority stake in this venture in 
tandem with Gazprom’s advances to enable the French GDF SUEZ to 
participate in Nord Stream pipeline. In addition, France’s Total energy 
company is closely linked to various Russian companies.  
           There is no doubt that Nord and South Stream pipeline projects are 
Russia’s main instruments to promote its energy and transit interests in 
Europe and which it exploits by affording various privileges to select EU 
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countries. These brief examples of state practices above indicate that energy 
policies among EU Member States that do not always diverge when it comes 
to Russian energy supplies. Rather, the policies formulated are subject to 
complex interdependence factors, which results in differing rationales and 
drives for energy trade relations with Russia.  
           It is also clear that it is difficult to isolate external relations of the EU 
Member States from affecting internal market rules of the EU. Given the 
various bilateral approaches undertaken towards Russia at the EU Common 
Energy Policy has had a limited effect. Currently, there are some 18 bilateral 
partnership agreements among 27 EU member States.141 A unified approach 
has also been hampered because the security framing of energy policy (as 
opposed to an economic activity) towards Russia contributed to the further 
legitimisation of EU member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty in the 
external energy policy domain. This has a direct influence on how the 
principle of solidarity is perceived and practiced by Member States. 
           The EU political institutions such as the European Parliament and the 
Commission spoke in favour of a ‘Common foreign energy policy strategy’ 
recognising the fact that energy supply could not be dealt with only within the 
market sphere, but also needed a strategic, foreign policy approach, 
enabling the EU to maintain a unitary position in international energy 
relations.142 The necessity of setting new instruments to govern energy at the 
EU level was also supported by dominant member states but at the same 
time these countries continued favouring their large national energy 
companies (national champions), contravening Internal Market rules and 
provoking intergovernmental disputes such as the Spanish-German conflict 
about the takeover of Endesa by E.ON that broke out at the end of 2006. 
Member states’ bilateral strategies to secure their energy supply also caused 
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major intra-EU tensions and mutual accusations of a lack of solidarity.143 
Two particularly contentious cases in this context have been Germany’s 
bilateral agreement with Russia to build ‘Nord Stream’ under the Baltic Sea 
without intermediaries; and Hungary and Italy’s deals with Gazprom to build 
the ‘South Stream’ pipeline to the detriment of the Nabucco pipeline, one of 
the main European projects for diversifying the sources of gas supplies to 
EU countries. These countries preferred intergovernmental cooperation 
outside the EU framework in clear defiance of solidarity. 
           Both the treaties (primary) and secondary legislation of the EU are 
international (and supranational) legal instruments thus the legal 
commitments emanating from them have profoundly shaped the EU project. 
It is clear that the EU is based on common values as it aspires to establish 
collective political and legal commitment amongst its Member States. Whilst 
the EU legal order operates pursuant to the doctrine of supremacy of EU 
law, the objectives contained in the Treaties and in the acts of the EU 
institutions cannot realistically be achieved through the immediate assertion 
of legal demands alone.144 This has been the case in regard to the principle 
of solidarity. In the energy field in particular, it is clear that Member State 
have conducted bilateral arrangements for their energy supplies from 
Russia. This is neither conducive to the establishment of a strong legal 
framework nor does it comply with the principle of solidarity. With the 
development of EU secondary legislation and embedding of the solidarity 
principle therein, there is a clear signal to Member States to coordinate and 
co-operate in their external energy policies. Ignoring this principle and hoping 
that it will never be enforced by the EU is wishful thinking. This principle is 
likely to become enforceable at EU level as the EU energy policies develop 
and harmonise, and once the current economic crisis is over. Accordingly, 
Member States should set clear, short, medium and long-term strategies in 
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4. Future Prospects  
 
Arguably, all inter-state trade relations ought to be put on a legal 
footing so as to enhance certainty and protection of the interests of the 
trading partners and other stakeholders. Among the several bilateral and 
multilateral legal instruments that are designed to enhance the security of 
energy supplies from Russia to the EU, there are number of regimes 
potentially capable of providing a sound basis for cooperation between the 
EU and Russia in the energy sector:  
 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1994 (PCA);  
 The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 1994;  
 Draft Convention on Energy Security;  
 The political agreements within the framework of EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue;145 
 The Treaty Establishing the Energy Community; and 
 The World Trade Organisation.146  
 
It is not possible to examine these regimes in detail within the scope 
of this article.147 However, it can be asserted that there are difficulties in 
establishing a common ground in EU-Russia relations within these 
international trade agreements. These difficulties stem from the fact that 
majority of these regimes are not strictly based on the rule of law as they 
lack a number of essential elements inter alia specific and explicit 
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commitments, an independent adjudication, effective and predictable legal 
redress and enforcement mechanisms.148 
The current situation indicates that the EU is facing a monopolistic 
and quasi-statist energy supplier, which is not willing to embed the energy 
trade in a predictable and independent legal framework. The rule of law is 
not only problematic in Russia’s external energy trade relations but also in its 
domestic sphere. For example, by utilising the military, law enforcement, and 
security agencies (siloviki), the Russian bureaucratic elite achieved the de 
facto nationalization of YUKOS (the largest oil company in Russia) while 
securing the imprisonment of its former owners. 149  It can be argued 
therefore, that in addition to creating a more predictable energy policy, the 
future of Russia depends on whether and to what extend the elites within 
Russia can agree on new rules of international trade.150  
The fact that the Member States of the EU are neither able to create 
solidarity or speak with one voice helps Russia’s dominance in political and 
economic power in energy trade. A number of suggestions have been made 
to improve the security of EU-Russia energy relations. For example, 
Konoplyanik proposes three possible ways for creating a “common EU-
Russia” energy space. 151  The first option is the export of EU acquis 
communautaire directly through geographic expansion of the EU or indirectly 
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through a new bilateral EU – Russia Agreement.  He opines that this is the 
least feasible option as Russia never expressed its willingness of either 
joining the EU or adopting its acquis in any way or through a bilateral 
agreement. The second option is the creation of the PCA either on principles 
of ECT or via a new agreement. The creation of a new PCA clearly faces a 
number of obstacles that may be impossible to circumvent. The third option 
that is advocated is the Russia’s accession to the ECT. Although this option 
would be the best way forward to improve security in EU – Russia energy 
relations, it has become less feasible in light of the recent Russian 
withdrawal of its provisional application of the ECT.  
In addition, it is feasible to create a single energy market and ensure 
EU competition rules are enforced in the energy sector.152 This is one of the 
priorities of the EU Commission.153  Once an integrated energy sector is 
established, it will be easier to achieve energy security and regulate internal 
and external suppliers (including Gazprom) effectively. In fact, on 03 October 
2013, the EU Commission has instigated an anti-trust case against 
Gazprom, which could lead to a £9.26bn fine.154 Subsequently in February 
2014, despite the initial resistance to cooperate with the Commission’s 
investigation, it was reported that Gazprom would implement European 
Union market rules and would not “question (implementation) of the EU's 
Third Energy Package”.155 Willingness by Russia to comply should not come 
as a surprise because the long-term Russia gas supply contract expires in 
                                                             
152
 EU Commission, ‘Making the internal energy market work’, COM (2012) 6663.  
153
 EU Commission, ‘Single Market Act II: Twelve priority actions for new growth’, 
IP/12/1054, 03.10.2012. For example, Article 36 of the Directive 2009/73/EC, could be 
applied vigorously to control and check investment by dominant companies such as 
Gazprom. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the Gas Directive see, Yafimava 
K., The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target Model: major contentious issues 
inside and outside the EU, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 75, April 2013, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NG-75.pdf. 
154
 The initial investigation was started in September 2012.  
155
 Sytas A. et al., Russia's Gazprom agrees to adopt EU market rules in Lithuania –PM, 
Reuters, 07 February 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/lithuania-gazprom-
idUKL5N0LC2HU20140207.  
 36 
2015156 and the maintenance and the cost of the energy production is a 
major concern for Russia.157 However, with the escalation of crisis in Ukraine 
and Crimea, it is not clear whether the promises to comply with the EU rules 
will be fulfilled.  
Current circumstances suggest that there is no comprehensive 
solution to these problems. Arguably, the most appropriate solution is the 
exploitation of the existing avenue of EU-Russia energy relations via the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue and other international legal forums to which both 
parties belong.158 Although these platforms, apart from the WTO DSU, are 
not capable of delivering legally binding measures, it provides a forum where 
political, legal and technical opinions of both sides could be confronted and 
addressed with the intention that perhaps, one day a legal consensus can be 
reached. 
The most recent developments in regards to the EU - Russian Energy 
relations are articulated in the 2013 Energy Dialogue Roadmap (EDR)159 
initiative following the Common Understanding on the Preparation of the 
Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050.160 The initiative 
serves as a generalized Terms of Reference for the future EU- Russia 
Energy Dialogue. The EDR sets out an ambitious strategic target of creating 
a Pan-European Energy space and there is a clear emphasis on 
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“improvement of the legal framework governing the relations, which should 
contain strong provisions on energy to lay a firm basis to permit the gradual 
approximation of rules, standards and markets in the field of energy which 
could be the basis for greater reciprocal investments and technology 
exchange”. However, in the immediate future it is unlikely that the current 
energy EU-Russia trade environment will be set against a legalistic 
framework.  
In the coming months the EU is likely to intensify the diversification of 
its energy supply whilst limiting investment by Russian companies in the 
single market. This could mean turning to North Africa (e.g. Algeria) and to 
other EEA countries such as Norway; and investing in alternative energy 
(e.g. renewables) and enhancing existing extraction of fossil fuels (e.g. coal 
and gas) and using unconventional extraction methods such as hydraulic 
fracturing (a.k.a. fracking for shale gas).161   
           With the crisis in Crimea, both national and regional security rhetoric 
are increasingly shaping the EU – Russia relations.162 In this context energy 
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           Having explored the evolution of the current state of energy trade and 
relations between the EU and Russia it is possible to conclude that the 
attempts by the EU to secure its energy supplies have been twofold:  
Firstly, the EU has taken internal steps and reformed both its 
institutional framework and competences of its agents (e.g. the Commission 
and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security) in the realm of 
international energy trade and security. In tandem with these changes the 
principle of solidarity has been acknowledged in the Treaty so as to enhance 
the political and economic power of the EU. The latter initiative however has 
been hampered by different interests and at times conflicting priorities and 
strategies of Member States. It could be argued that although the principle of 
solidarity features persistently in a number of legal provisions, its application 
has been diverse and has not been effective in regards to EU energy policy. 
Secondly, the EU has endeavoured to engage with Russia at bilateral and 
multilateral legal platforms so as to place its energy trade with Russia in a 
legal footing. However, Russia continually resisted such initiatives and such 
stance has been perceived as “a signal to the international community that 
Russia refuses to live by its international commitments and is not interested 
in protecting future energy investments.”163 
                  Russia owns and the EU needs an invaluable commodity – 
energy – for their economic development and security. This mutual reliance 
however has not been reflected on the legal framework as the demand for 
Russian energy is great and the EU has not managed to diversify its energy 
sources or suppliers, yet. Until this aspect of the EU-Russia energy relations 
changes, it will be challenging to create solidarity between Member States 
and to convince Russia to commit to legal obligations. Unilateral and bilateral 
action and agreements also undermine the EU’s overall normative and 
institutionalist approach to international energy relations as well as its 
credibility because of its underlying contradictions to the main principles of 
the Energy Charter Treaty. Importantly, such bilateral policies and practices 
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pursued by the key EU member states (namely, Germany, France, Italy, etc) 
put smaller economies in a predicament as they have to either continue to 
call for a stronger common EU energy security policy which ensure solidarity 
(which is hindered by the stronger Members State by the bilateral deals with 
Russia), or with the limited bargain they have, they end up negotiating 
bilateral deals with Russia.  
           The EU has sufficient legal scope to create a common energy policy 
both internally and externally. The doctrine of solidarity is still developing and 
is likely to become a permanent feature of external energy policy as the 
internal (EU) energy market is harmonised and regulated effectively with the 
enforcement of competition and anti-trust rules. This is a priority for the EU 
as integrated energy infrastructure is a precondition for economic integration 
and growth. 164  However, Member States have continuously preferred to 
pursue bilateral trade agreements and this in turn has weakened the potency 
and spirit of the solidarity.  
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